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ABSTRACT: Recent cross sectional growth studies have found that
ethnolinguistic fractionalization is an important explanatory variable of long-run
growth performance. In the present paper we follow the call of earlier studies to
conduct a more detailed clinical analysis of the growth experience of a speci…c
country. South Africa constitutes an interesting case in which to explore these
questions. The results of this study provide important nuance to the existing
body of evidence. We …nd that fractionalization is subject to strong change over
time. In addition, we …nd strong evidence of webs of association between the
various social, political and institutional dimensions. Thus various forms of social
cleavage tend to go hand in hand which presents the danger of spurious inference
of association. Further, the direction of association in the preponderance of cases
runs from economic to social, political and institutional variables, rather than the
other way around. However, there remain signi…cant impacts from some, but
only some fractionalization indexes on economic growth. Which social cleavage,
when, how and for what period of time will depend on the historical path of
speci…c societies.
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1 Introduction
The lack of convergence in the growth patterns of developing versus devel-
oped countries has led to a plethora of research examining this apparent
anomaly. New growth theorists have pointed to the role of technology, hu-
man capital, and institutions besides the more traditional economic vari-
ables. Easterly and Levine (1997), in an in‡uential article, drew attention
to the potentially important role of ethnic diversity in in‡uencing economic
growth. They examined the hypothesis that “cross-country di¤erences in
ethnic diversity explain a substantial part of the cross country di¤erences in
public policies, political instability, and other factors associated with long-
run growth.” They …nd that ethnic diversity is an important predictor of
economic performance, and of the African growth experience. (Easterly and
Levine, 1997: 1205). Central to Easterly and Levine’s perspective is the ques-
tion of whether the level of ethnic fractionalization bears on the potential for
distributional con‡ict.1
International studies have been constrained by the cross sectional (and
single time point) nature of the data on many institutional and social charac-
teristics - particularly fractionalization. The …rst extension that the present
study permits is the examination of a single clinical case study, over an ex-
tended time horizon. For South Africa the long standing policy concern with
race, ethnicity and language has led to the availability of long running time
series in the social, political and institutional (SPI) dimensions. This allows
us to pose anumber of questions that have not yet been addressed inthe liter-
ature.2 To what extent are the various SPI-dimensions stationary over time?
1Also see Alesina et al (2002), Collier (2001), Knack and Keefer (1997), and Posner
(2004).
2South Africa constitutes an interesting case in which to explore these questions. In
terms of the Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index cited by Easterly and Levine, South
Africa in 1960 ranked 6th out of 66 countries covered by this index with a value on the
measure of 88 (that is a probability of 88% that two randomly chosen individuals are
of di¤erent ethno-linguistic origin). Important, too, in the South African case is that
from 1948 through to the demise of Apartheid, a major attempt was made to socially
and politically “engineer” South Africa along the lines of supposedly “essentialist” ethnic
identities. At least with regard to the “African” community these ethnic divisions were
meant tocoincide with linguistic identities. That South Africa continues to be linguistically
highly fractionalized is registered by the fact that the present (post 1994) Constitution
acknowledges linguistic diversity through the legal recognition of eleven o¢cial languages.
If fractionalization is an important explanatory variable in the long run growth process of
a country, South Africa is ideal to test this hypothesis.Fractionalization and Long-Run Economic Growth 2
Attributing long term economic performance to an ethno-linguistic fraction-
alization index measuredat one point in time (typically 1960), presumes that
the index is relatively unchanging over time, precipitating the economic per-
formance that we observe subsequently. The availability of time series data
allows us to assess the plausibility of this assumption - at least for the case
of South Africa.
Time series data also allows us to assess the patterns of association be-
tween variables in greater detail. Is it the case that the various SPI variables
available for this study are independent of one another? Do some move to-
gether over time, if they move at all? Which do so move together? Are the
social, political and institutional dimensions being measured variables that
drive the economic characteristics of the economy, or does the economy in
turn have the capacity to change social, political and institutional features
of the society? English, for instance, has become the principal language of
communication among scientists and technologists. Similarly, English is the
lingua Franca ofairline pilots andair tra¢c controllers. The outcome of indi-
vidual rational action under these circumstances might well be a shift toward
greater aggregate linguistic homogeneity. Economic growth, and the policies
and choices that are associated with it, might be as important in creating
linguistic homogeneity as linguistic homogeneity is in favouring growth. By
using statistical tests designed to establish the direction of association be-
tween variables, we are able to examine these questions in greater detail.3
This raises an important question which has not been addressed su¢-
ciently by the cross sectional growth literature on fractionalization, namely
the direction of association between fractionalization and growth. Although
numerous studies have concluded that social fractionalization does indeed
retard economic growth, there is an older literature which argues that the
direction of association runs from the economic to the social and political.
This modernization hypothesis developed by Lipset (1959) posits the evo-
lution of social and political institutions, and democracy in particular, as a
consequence of economic development.4 The implication is that economic
growth, and the evolution of per capita GDP is not only the source of social
and political development, but as a necessary corollary it will entail signif-
3The possibility of associations between and amongst SPI variables themselves, raises
the additional concern that the introduction of any one of the SPI-dimensions into any
growth equation for estimation, may generate spurious results. Analysis of the webs of
association between the SPI variables should improve our understanding of this danger
4For a South African perspective, see Fedderke, de Kadt and Luiz (2001b).Fractionalization and Long-Run Economic Growth 3
icant disruption of established political order in the process of realising the
change. One author states the link as follows:
Social and economic change ... extend political consciousness,
multiply political demands, broadenpolitical participation. These
changes undermine traditional sources of political authority and
traditional political institutions ... The result is political instabil-
ity and disorder. The primary problem of politics is a lag in the
development of political institutions behind social and economic
change (Huntington, 1968:5).
On thisviewtherefore, economicdevelopmentcanbeidenti…ed as a (ifnot
the) source of political instability.5 Given the context of the fractionalization
literature which posits its potential for distributional con‡ict, it is surpris-
ing that economists have not examined the possibility of reverse causation
through a modernization-type e¤ect. It is possible that it is economic growth
which unleashes social and political change both through choice and through
con‡ict, along the lines proposed by modernization theory. If this is the case,
then ethnolinguistic fractionalization could very well be endogenously deter-
mined though economic progress rather than an exogenous and deterministic
cause of economic outcomes. In fact in this paper we …nd some evidence sup-
porting a modernization e¤ect with economic development driving political
rights and a¤ecting ethnolinguistic fractionalization. We …nd that fractional-
ization matters for economic growth but not ethnolinguistic fractionalization
as has been posited in the literature. In the South African case it is racial
fractionalization which impacts on growth. We conclude that it is unlikely
that the default cleavage for distributional con‡ict will necessarily be ethno-
linguistic rather than other forms of social and political cleavages including
those of race, politics, religion and class - clinical country case studies will
reveal which fractionalization index represents the de…ning cleavage for that
society.
Section 2 presents various social, political and institutional fractionaliza-
tion variables (SPIVs) for South Africa. Section 3 examines the interaction
5In traditional South African growth debates, this view underpins the interpretation
of the South African growth path that is present in the contributions of O’Dowd (1974,
1978), and Bromberger (1974, 1978), for instance. Presentation of international evidence
is myriad with both a¢rmative (see for instance Muller (1997) and more sceptical views
present in the literature (see for instance Huntington (1984), though the scepticism is
revised somewhat in (1991).Fractionalization and Long-Run Economic Growth 4
e¤ects of these SPIVs and the webs of association between them. Section 4
provides a structural model employing a vector error-correction mechanism
(VECM) framework of estimation, and section 5 concludes.
2 The South African Data6
The fractionalization indexes presented below were constructed by consult-
ing o¢cial South African government statistical sources which are based on
census data. Between 1910 and 1960 our principal source has been the Union
Statistics for 50 Years. Subsequently the Central Statistical Services Reports
were our primary sources. Given that data is frequently collected only in cen-
sus years, the data series below were constructed by means of interpolation
between these years. In addition, not all variables were available over the full
1910-2000 timeframe considered for this study. We note these limits where
relevant.
The study reports more than just the degree of linguistic fractionalization
in South African society. A list of variables and their de…nition is provided
in Appendix A.
Linguistic fractionalization was measured from 1946 through to 1993.7
The broad pattern that emerges is the following: from 1946 through to 1991,
the overall level of linguistic fractionalization remains high in the 0.8-0.9
range with a downward trend over the long term. Note that the measure-
ment of linguistic fractionalization is subject to measurement error. This
arises above all because the scope and accuracy of coverage of di¤erent pop-
ulation groups has not been consistent over time. Particularly with respect
to Africans, early (but also subsequent) years showed incomplete data col-
lection, rendering data unreliable. Moreover, under Apartheid and the re-
6A more comprehensive discussion of the fractionalization indexes and methodological
questions surrounding their construction is presented in Fedderke, Luiz and De Kadt
(2005).










where ni denotes the number of members of households that cite the i0th language as
the principal medium of communication within the household, N denotes the number of
members in the population. F thus computes the probability that two randomly chosen
individuals speak di¤erent …rst languages.Fractionalization and Long-Run Economic Growth 5
peated creation, rede…nition, and disappearance of supposedly ethnically de-
…ned Homelands, signi…cant portions of the African population disappeared,
moved classi…cation, and reappeared in statistical sources. After 1970 the
active creation of Homelands for Africans under Apartheid policies shifted
responsibility for census data collection away from Pretoria. Data collection
on …rst language orientation by Homelands was negligible. Note that we
have corrected for the Homeland population in the fractionalization series
presented here, except in the case of religion where it was not possible.8
We also examine fractionalization in a number of additional dimensions.
One of these is provided by an index of diversity of religious a¢liation.9
Our approach to the construction of an index of religious fractionalization
followed that of the approach to the construction of the index of linguistic
fractionalization. In the case of religious fractionalization, we capture data
from 1920 through to 1991.10 The level of total religious fractionalization
increases through the period for which we have data, from just below 0.8
to close to 0.9. As for linguistic fractionalization, religious fractionalization
su¤ers substantially from data collectionproblems. Inthe case of the African
population group, religious fractionalization may have increased at least in
part because of increased diversity of categories under which religious a¢lia-
tion was collected over time, rather than any underlying change in religious
belief structure. After 1970 data collection on religious a¢liation by Home-
lands was negligible.
We have also included a measure of political fractionalization.11 The in-
dex is computed on parliamentary representation - and only for the White
House ofAssembly, exceptfor the 1994 and 1998 data points whichare for the
…rst democratic parliaments.12 A number of caveats need to be mentioned
8A general point that emerges for studies employing measures of linguistic fractional-
ization, is that given the data problems even for a country such as South Africa, which
amongst developing countries has relatively extensive and sound data collection proce-
dures, this raises signi…cant questions concerning the quality of data for developing coun-
tries in general.
9On a prior analysis of religious fractionalization and its economic impacts, see Barro
and McCleary (2003).
10Again the time frame was dictated by data availability.
11The measure was …rst introduced in Fedderke et al (2001a).
12From 1910-1983 South Africa had only the House of Assembly as its formal legislative
chamber. It essentially represented Whites, though even prior to 1983 representation of
Africans, Coloureds and Asians existed under the Representation of Natives Act (1936),
and the Separate Representation of Voters Act (1955). Such representation was moreFractionalization and Long-Run Economic Growth 6
here. First, given the nature of South Africa’s political history, with high
levels of repression and the formal banning of political parties and organiza-
tions, any measure of political fractionalization will be partial. To attempt
to measure overall political party support or membership would have been
impossible. The only parties for whichsuch data might have beenreasonably
reliably obtained would have been the legally recognized, mostly white, par-
ties. Our approach, therefore, was to measure the level of fractionalization
within the legislature which is the body in which policies that bore upon
the performance of the economy were formulated. The bias that results is
obvious. Surprisingly, however, the correlation between this clearly biased
measure of political fractionalization and alternative measures of civil and
political rights, the CIVLIB measure from Freedom House, and the PolFree
measure from Fedderke, De Kadt and Luiz (2001a), deliver correlation co-
e¢cients of 0.69 and 0.77 respectively. The surprising …nding is thus that
the political fractionalization of what is clearly a very partial parliamentary
system nevertheless re‡ected in surprising degree the state of rights struc-
tures in the society as a whole. At least some information is contained in the
measure therefore.
In South Africa, during the course of the twentieth century, a major at-
tempt was made to socially and politically engineer the country along ethnic
lines. However, the dominant de facto cleavage was and continues to be one
of race. Accordingly we also computed a racial fractionalization measure
along the established Apartheid classi…catory systems of Whites, Coloureds,
Asians and Africans. Racial fractionalization in South Africa fell from 0.49
in 1911 to approximately 0.36 in 2001 as the population became increasingly
African and racially homogeneous. Since the populations of the Homelands
was almost entirely African, correction of the aggregate South African racial
fractionalization index was straightforward, by simple inclusion of the aggre-
gate Homeland populations in the African population series.
We conclude the data section with a number of brief general observations
about the data structure.
First, we note that while many of the aggregate fractionalization indexes
show considerable stationarity over time, this is not universally true (for in-
notional than real. From 1983 South Africa introduced a three chamber parliament, with
a White House of Assembly, the Asian House of Delegates, and the Coloured House of
Representatives. Africans had no representation (outside of the notionally independent
ethnically de…ned homelands), until 1994 and the introduction and the …rst democratic
South African parliament.Fractionalization and Long-Run Economic Growth 7
stance for racial fractionalization), and even whereit doeshold, the aggregate
stability often hides substantial movement at the subcomponent population
group level.13
Second, we emphasize the signi…cant di¢culties associated with data col-
lection surrounding social cleavage.14 Consistency, as well as reliability of
data compilation must play a role across wide geographical reaches, and pe-
riods of time. Infact, the countries withthe highest levels offractionalization
are those most likely to have the most contentious data being employed in
cross sectional studies.
Finally, the evidence on various fractionalization indexes reported above
presents the suggestion that various social cleavages (for instance religious
and linguistic fractionalization) show a strong correspondence. Where the
society is fractionalized in one, it is tempting to conclude that it will be
fractionalized in other dimensions also. For instance, racial fractionalization
will be mirrored in linguistic as well as religious diversity. An immediate
implication is that the signi…cance of the any statistical evidence must be
carefully considered for the possibility of spurious associations.
3 Interaction E¤ects: deepening and developing the
web of association between the SPIV’s and economic
development
Thus far we have focused our discussion on the introduction of a range of
social, political, and institutional variables available in South Africa (hence-
forth SPIV’s). The …rst question concerns the presence of any systematic
association between the SPIV’s themselves, or between the SPIV’s and eco-
nomic dimensions of interest to economic growth.
In order to explore the directions of association between the variables
included in this study, we consider the use of the test statistic proposed by
Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1996, 2001) (hereafter PSS) F-statistics.15
13See Fedderke, Luiz and De Kadt (2005) for a more detailed exposition
14At this point we do not develop this point further - but note that in cross sectional
contexts this issue surely compounds - see Fedderke, Luiz and De Kadt (2005) for a more
detailed exposition
15See also the discussion in Pesaran (1997) and Pesaran and Shin (1995a, 1995b) and
Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001). Suppose that the question is whether there exists a
long run relationship between the set of variables yt;x1; :::xn;t: Univariate time seriesFractionalization and Long-Run Economic Growth 8
In Table 1 we present the results of the application of the PSS F-test
methodology to the variables included in this study, in a series of bivariate
applications.16 In keeping with the international evidence, we consider the
possibilityof associations betweenall the variables inlevels, exceptfor growth
in real output and the time rate of change in the real capital stock, which
are by de…nition already ‡ows.
The general conclusion that there exist patterns of associations between
the SPIV’s is con…rmed by the test statistics, and we summarize the …ndings
from the bivariate tests in Figure 1 below, and the results from ARDL and
VECM17 (as appropriate) cointegrating estimations are reported in Tables
characteristics of the data are not known for certain. The PSS approach to testing for the


















The test proceeds by computing the standard F-statistic for the joint signi…cance of ±1 =
±2 = ::: = ±n+1 = 0;under all feasible alternative LHS variables. While the distribution
of the test statistic is non-standard, with xi;t » I(0)8i providing a lower bound value,
xi;t » I(1)8i an upper bound value to the test statistic. The test is analogous to a
Granger causality test, but in the presence of non-stationary data. This renders the PSS
F-test suitable in the current context.
16We also examined correlation coe¢cients. Appendix B reports the results. In partic-
ular, we …nd that: high religious fractionalization is associated with lower political frac-
tionalization, and lower political rights; high religious fractionalization is associated with
higher output; high linguistic fractionalization is associated with lower property rights;
high linguistic fractionalization is associated with lower output and capital stock, but
with higher investment in capital; high political fractionalization is associated with higher
political rights; high political fractionalization is associated with lower output; there is a
positive association between political and property rights; property rights are negatively
associated with racial fractionalization; property rights are positively associated with out-
put, capital and investment; instability does not appear to be strongly associated with any
other dimension; racial fractionalization is negatively associated with output and capital
stock, and positively associated with investment.
17The vector error correction approach to cointegration is now standard, and requires
little elaboration. See Johansen (1988), and Johansen and Juselius (1990, 1992).Fractionalization and Long-Run Economic Growth 9
2a, 2b and 2c.18
We draw seven central conclusions from the evidence presented in these
tables.
Conjecture 1 Conjecture 1: Social cleavage does hang together.
This follows immediately from noting that the various fractionalization
indexes included in the study do show strong patterns of mutual association
amongst one another. Linguistic, religious, political and racial fractional-
ization appear to move together, with linguistic fractionalization being the
outcome variable re‡ecting changes in political fractionalization, religious
fractionalization and racial fractionalization (see column 2 of Table 1, in
contrast to columns 1, 3, and 10). Moreover, in bivariate ARDL cointegra-
tion estimations the sign of association between all of the fractionalization
indexes proves positive - seecolumns 1 through 3of Table 2a. The …rst impli-
cation of the “causality” tests therefore appears to be that use of linguistic
fractionalization as an indicator of (common) underlying social cleavages,
may be justi…ed for South Africa.
Conjecture 2 Conjecture 2: In general, social cleavage does not impact on
economic growth - instead social cleavage responds to economic growth.
Generallythefractionalizationindexes includedinthestudydonotemerge
as forcing variables for the economic development indicators - see columns 7,
8, and 9 of Table 1. Instead, it appears as if economic variables drive social
fractionalization - see columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table 1. Higher levels of real
18The PSS ARDL approach to cointegration does allow for some ‡exibility in the use
of both I(0) and I(1) data, and we proceed with the analysis on this basis. Considera-
tion of the stationarity properties of the data implied by augmented Dickey-Fuller test
statistics, precludes the possibility of systematic association between at least some vari-
able groups. Some variables are I(0) (LANGFRAC, GROWTH), some I(1) (POLFRAC,
INSTAB, POLRGHT, PROPRGHT, LNRGDP, dK/dt), and in two cases the variables
are I(2) (RELFRAC, RACE). The implication is immediately that at least some of the
associations suggested by the F-tests for direction of association of Table 1 are likely to
be spurious. Instead, the univariate time series structure of the data suggests that as-
sociations between the variables included in this study may have to be found between
transformed variables. We note at the outset that where the univariate time series charac-
teristics of the data are rigorously adhered to, the implied associations between variables
becomes between levels, changes in variables, as well as rates of change. Problems of
interpretation compound.Fractionalization and Long-Run Economic Growth 10
output appear to result in lower levels of linguistic fractionalization - consis-
tent with the social integration we might expect from modernization theory
- though an acceleration of economic growth is associated with an increase
in linguistic fractionalization - see columns 4 through 6 of Table 2a.
Conjecture 3 Conjecture 3: There is one form of social cleavage that does
appear to impact on economic growth
The only exception to the …nding that fractionalization does not force
growth emerges with respect to religious fractionalization, and racial frac-
tionalization - see columns 7 and 8 of Table 1. That racial fractionalization
in South Africa may in‡uence economic growth is not in itself surprising.
However, for both fractionalization indexes the sign with respect to growth
is positive, and only racial fractionalization proves to carry a statistically
signi…cant impact (see columns 1 and 2 of Table 2b).
The surprising implication is therefore that higher racial fractionalization
increases economic growth.
Conjecture 4 Conjecture 4: The interpretation of the impact of social cleav-
age suggests the importance of distributional con‡ict and its impact on eco-
nomic growth.
The preceding result carries some general substantive lessons.
We …nd that higher racial fractionalization led to higher levels of political
instability - signi…cant at the 10% level (see column 2 of Table 2c). In this
sense, the results ofour study are consistent withthe Easterly-Levine …nding.
But it should be emphasized that what is con…rmed by the South African
evidence is that the impact on economic growth emerges from distributional
con‡ict, organized along very particular lines of social cleavage which are
neither ethnic nor linguistic in the …rst instance, but race-de…ned instead.
The arguments on either side of the debate on the relevance of ethno-
linguistic fractionalization for development thus may both carry merit. Eth-
nolinguistic fractionalization may indeed correlate with economic develop-
ment. But this correlation could be spurious, in the sense that the ethnolin-
guistic fractionalization really captures the impact of another social cleavage
along which distributional con‡ict is organized (recall that the di¤erent frac-
tionalizations hang together). Its impact may also really capture the impact
of distributional con‡ict, rather than of ethnic or linguistic fractionalizationFractionalization and Long-Run Economic Growth 11
per se. What comes to matter is whether social cleavage comes to be mobi-
lized, how social cleavage comes to be mobilized, by which political agents,
and for what ends. Because what really matters is not the cleavage, but that
it comes to serve as a political tool in distributional con‡ict. The particular
cleavage is largely immaterial, and may be di¤erent in di¤erent societies, and
even di¤erent in a speci…c society at di¤erent times in its history.
The particularities of the histories of speci…c societies are crucial, includ-
ing in terms of how to interpret the empirical evidence that emerges. Thus
the emergence of a positive sign between racial fractionalization and growth
in South Africa does not re‡ect a rejection of the negative impact of dis-
tributional con‡ict - instead it re‡ects the dynamics of the political process
in South Africa, with a sharpening of the battle lines of distributional con-
‡ict prior to its (at least institutional) resolution. Viewing the evidence in
terms of its dynamic evolution over time, therefore may well preclude simple
monotonic associations between fractionalization and economic development
outcomes: things may often get worse before they get better.
Finally, the policy implications are also important: since what is required
is the management of distributional con‡ict, not the management of any
particular form of social cleavage per se (racial, or ethnic, or linguistic - it
could be any one or any combination of these that serves as the catalyst for
distributional con‡ict). Vigilance has to be general, and perhaps assume the
form of institutional checks and balances.
Conjecture 5 Conjecture 5: Path dependence carries furthermethodological
lessons: we need more clinical evidence to deepen our general understanding
The …ndings surrounding the impact of racial fractionalization are un-
likely to generalize beyond the South African case. An immediate method-
ological lesson that follows is that the need for clinical studies that a¤ord the
opportunity of exploring possible path dependencies and unique character-
istics of growth paths already noted in this and other studies is rea¢rmed.
A cursory examination of the international political landscape reveals great
complexities around distributional con‡ict and demonstrate that it is un-
likely that ethnolinguistic fractionalization is necessarily the de…ning social
fault line. Whilst ethnolinguistic fractionalization may be the social cleavage
which resulted in con‡ict in Rwanda and Burundi, it is not clear that this is
thecase inother con‡icts.19 The long lasting con‡ict in Northern Ireland was
19A countervailing view on the con‡ict in Rwanda argues that it was less about ethnicityFractionalization and Long-Run Economic Growth 12
ostensibly waged between Protestants and Catholics and was thus driven by
a religious cleavage. The balkanization of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union
had many dimensions including ethnolinguistic and religious cleavages. It
is simplistic therefore to assume that the default cleavage for distributional
con‡ict will necessarily be ethnolinguistic rather than other forms of social
and political cleavages including the most obvious of race and religion.
Conjecture 6 Conjecture 6: The rights structure proves largely irrelevant -
though improved property rights lower political instability.
Associationbetween political instability and property rights is ambiguous
on the PSS F-tests, with the possibility of simultaneity between the variables
(see columns 5 and 6 of Table 1). We therefore tested for the direction of
association by means of weak exogeneity tests in a VECM framework, and
found the direction of association to run from property rights to political
instability (see column 7 of Table 2c).20 The implication of the long run
coe¢cient obtained from the estimation of the relevant cointegrating vector
just identi…ed on property rights, suggests a negative association between
political instability and property rights. Improved property rights are thus
associated with lower political instability.
Neither political rights nor property rights appear to impact on any of
the fractionalization indexes (see columns 1,2 and 3 of Table 1). However,
both linguistic fractionalization and racial fractionalization does appear to
impact on political rights in South Africa (see column4 of Table 1) - a plausi-
ble result given South Africa’s history of racial and ethnic politics. However,
ARDL cointegration estimation of these relationships returns statistically in-
signi…cant coe¢cients - of positive sign (suggesting higher fractionalization
improves political rights) - and the error correction process is of the incor-
rect sign, suggesting the absence of an equilibrium relationship between the
variables (see columns 3 and 4 of Table 2b).
Conjecture 7 Conjecture 7: There are further webs of association - which
are not always easy to understand. 21
and rather an outcome of the unbearable stress on the land as a result of a Malthusian
population trap (see Andre and Platteau, 1998).
20This emerges form the fact that in the loading matrix of the VECM structure, both
elements of the loading matrix associated with political instability reject the presence of an
equilibrium relationship for political instability. By contrast, the loading matrix con…rms
the presence of an equilibrium relationship for property rights.
21Also see Fedderke and Klitgaard (1998).Fractionalization and Long-Run Economic Growth 13
There are further associations among the SPIV’s, andbetweenthe SPIV’s
and the indicators of economic development, which are di¢cult to interpret
in the absence of clear theoretical guidance.
Thus political instability appears to force linguistic fractionalization (see
column 2 of Table 1). However, ARDL cointegration estimation suggests the
sign of association to be negative - such that rising political instability lowers
linguistic fractionalization (see column 6 of Table 2a).
Political instability is an outcome variable relative to a number of other
variables, including political andracial fractionalization, property rights, out-
put, growth and the change in the capital stock (see column 6 of Table 1).
However, of these only two are statistically signi…cant. Moreover, increasing
output proves to have a positive impact on instability, while political frac-
tionalization carries a positive sign (and is signi…cant only at the 10% level)
(see Table 2c).
The impact of growth on property rights proves statistically insigni…cant,
while none of the SPIV variables prove to have a signi…cant impact on the
time rate of change of the aggregate capital stock.22
Some …nal comments
The implication of thebaseline evidence from“causality”testsis therefore
that thereexists awebofassociationbetween the alternativefractionalization
indexes. Di¤erent forms of social cleavage tend to go together.
Only some fractionalization indexes impact on economic growth in South
Africa, however. It is racial, not linguistic fractionalization which matters
in the South African context- despite the positive association between the
two indexes. The impact of racial fractionalization suggests that what really
drives growth is distributional con‡ict, and that the mobilization of social
cleavage in its support renders the particular form of cleavage chosen contin-
gent.
The implicationis alsothat path dependence matters - both inidentifying
which form of social cleavage matters, and in interpreting the evidence.
Thus the relationships that are widely investigated and employed in cross
sectional studies do receive support from the time series evidence - though
the approach required to the evidence requires additional nuance.
Finally, what is perhaps interesting about evidence such as that presented
22Though note that both Fielding (2000) and Fedderke (2004) …nd political instability
to be a signi…cant and powerful driver of investment in the South African manufacturing
sector.Fractionalization and Long-Run Economic Growth 14
onthe link between fractionalization and output is that it lends itself to some
tentative hypotheses. For instance, the evidence might be read as consistent
with the hypothesis on identity formation we voiced earlier. The negative
link between output and linguistic fractionalization, and the positive link
between religious fractionalization and output might be construed as evi-
dence in favour of changing patterns of identity formation - from roots-based
to choice based identity formation. Of course, the direction of association
runs from religious fractionalization to output, not the other way round.
But broadly speaking the interpretation might remain one of modernization:
economic development dissolves traditional identity structure, to be replaced
by new identity formation processes that prove to be selected in for their
congruence with the requirements of economic development.
We note this hypothesis here not because we believe the evidence proves
its truth - or necessarily because we believe it plausible. Instead, the point
here is to illustrate the di¢culty of interpreting SPIV’s in standard growth
regressions. Inclusion of the alternate fractionalization indexes might leave
one with a variable on the right hand side of the expression being estimated,
which is either an outcome variable, or a forcing variable; it might enter
either with positive or negative sign; and they might or might not be linked
to a latent variable. Understanding the precise meaning of such results is
non-trivial.
4 A Structural Model
Perhaps the most obvious inference to drawfrom the exploratory data analy-
sis is that the formulation of astructural model surrounding social cleavage is
complex. We nevertheless proceed with parsimonious representations of the
general lessons that have emerged from the exploratory data analysis. The
objective of the exercise is to explore whether the most central of the broad
conjectures outlined above are robust to a multivariate framework, which
allows for feedback e¤ects to be present in the data.
The key propositions we explore here are those formulated under conjec-
tures 3, 4, and 6 above. In particular, the …rst suggestion is that it is racial
fractionalization that has a growth impact in South Africa. Second, that
the channel of in‡uence through which racial fractionalization exercises its
in‡uence is through its impact on distributional con‡ict rather than directly
on growth through poor policymaking, say. Thus, racial fractionalizationFractionalization and Long-Run Economic Growth 15
impacts on political instability, thence on growth. Finally, the role of rights
is more di¤erentiated. The impact of property rights is held to be on po-
litical instability; while we explore the possibility that political rights are
an outcome variable of a range of institutional and economic development
indicators.
Estimation of the structural system is by standard time series techniques,
with variables that are …rst-di¤erence stationary. Johansen23 techniques of
estimation are now standard, so that discussion of estimation methodology
here can be brief. We employ a vector error-correction mechanism (VECM)
framework, for which, in the case of a set of k variables, we may have coin-
tegrating relationships denoted r, such that 0· r · k ¡ 1:This gives us a
k-dimensional VAR:
zt = A1zt¡1 +¢ ¢¢ +Amzt¡m + ¹ +±t (1)
where m denotes lag length, ¹ a set of deterministic components and ± a




¡i¢zt¡i + ¦zt¡k+1 + ¹ +±t (2)
Theexistenceof r cointegratingrelationships amounts tothe hypothesis that:
H1(r) : ¦ = ®¯
0
(3)
where ¦ is pxp, and ®, ¯ are pxr matrices of full rank. H1(r) is thus the
hypothesis ofreduced rank of ¦. Where r > 1, issues of identi…cation arise.24
Estimation is by VECM cointegration.
We postulate a labour intensive output (denoted LYPC) equation which
loads on the investment rate (IY), the user cost of capital (UC) and polit-
ical instability (INSTAB).25 We further incorporate the insight of Fedderke
and Luiz (2005) that crime rates (CRIMPOP) impact both on South African
growth processes, as well as on through its impact on political instability.
23See Johansen (1991) and Johansen and Juselius (1990).
24See Wickens (1996), Johansen and Juselius (1990, 1992), Pesaran and Shin (1995a,
1995b), Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1996).
25The …rst di¤erence speci…cation is driven by the iI(2) structure of racial fractional-
ization in South Africa. Inclusion into the Johansen VECM framework thus requires the
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Political instability (INSTAB) is driven by the change in racial fractional-
ization (DRACE), per capita output (LYPC), and property rights (PROP).
Finally, political rights (POL) aredetermined by instability (INSTAB), prop-
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in which T denotes a time trend, and identi…cation proceeds by
¯14 =;¯16 = ¯17 = ¯19 = 0;¯21 = ¯24 = ¯25 = 0;¯31 = ¯36 = ¯37 =
¯38 = 0: In addition, we impose weak-exogeneity restrictions on racial frac-
tionalization and the property rights dimension, such that, ®11 = ®12 =
®13 = ®51 = ®52 = ®53 = 0.26
The speci…cation therefore incorporates the three core conjectures we are
concerned with: an impact of racial fractionalization on political instability,
and from political instability on output; an impact of property rights on
instability, and political rights emerging as an outcome variable.
Table 3 reports the trace statistics on the number of cointegrating vectors
present in the data. The test reveals the presence of three cointegrating vec-
tors at the 5% level of signi…cance. We therefore proceed on the assumption
of three CV’s.
We report estimation results in column (1) of Table 4.
Findings generally are consistent with the priors to have emerged from
our conjectures. We …nd that increasing racial fractionalization and rising
26The exogeneity restrictions were extensively tested. Results that justify the restric-
tions under which estimation proceeds here have been presented more extensively elsewhere
- see Fedderke and Luiz (2005). Exogeneity of the racial composition of a population has
immediate intuitive purchase. While property rights exogeneity may be more controver-
sial, note that the restriction is merely on contemporaneous feedback e¤ects. Moreover,
that property rights might lead political rights has additional support in the literature
(Sened, 1997; Weimer, 1997; Schultz, 1992), and is justi…able on the grounds that rights
over property might be granted in an attempt to lower the danger of political change that
might widen access to rights over setting the fundamental rules of the game.Fractionalization and Long-Run Economic Growth 17
crime rates raise, while rising real per capita output and property rights
serve to lower political instability.27 Investment rates raise, while political
instability and the user cost of capital lower output. Political instability also
serves to raise political rights, as do property rights.
Unfortunately two features of the results prove fatal to the speci…cation
of column (1). First, results suggest that crime rates impact on output
positively (and statistically signi…cantly), while real per capita output has a
negative impact on political rights. Both signs are not readily supported the-
oretically. Second, andmost crucially, as cointegratingrelationships thethree
equations do not showerror correctionbehaviour - with explosive rather than
equilibriating behaviour being implied by the relevant coe¢cients from the
loading (a) matrix for the instability, output and political rights equations.
As a second speci…cation we therefore postulated a zero restriction on
the direct impact of crime on output. Thus identi…cation proceeds by ¯14 =
¯16 = ¯17 = ¯19 = 0;¯21 = ¯24 = ¯28 = 0;¯31 = ¯36 = ¯37 = ¯38 = 0; while
the weak-exogeneity restrictions on racial fractionalization and the property
rights dimension, ®11 = ®12 = ®13 = ®51 = ®52 = ®53 = 0, remained
unchanged.
Results are reported in column (2) of Table 4.
Findings are again consistent with priors - with the signs of associations
remaining unchanged from those encountered under the speci…cation of col-
umn (1). We note that implied elasticities (at the joint mean values of the
27One interpretation of the sign of the association between racial fractionalization and
instability is that it is a re‡ection of a minority elite that responded to a challenge of its
authority through two mechanisms. First, as the (White) ruling elite came to constitute
an ever smaller proportion of the total population, its response to the rising challenge to
its monopoly on power (see the political instability index reported in Fedderke et al 2001a)
was …rst to increase repression, and secondly to increase attempts at buying o¤ portions of
the majority of the population (for instance through the creation of homelands). Or con-
versely: higher racial fractionalization meant less need to buy o¤ the largest section of the
population, hence higher growth. The sign on the relationship between fractionalization
and growth is not stable across alternative speci…cations. For instance, Fedderke and Luiz
(2005) in an alternative speci…cation …nd contrary evidence on the sign of the association.
A possible reason for the lack of stability may be the presence of non-linearities in the
association - necessitating the use of threshold autoregressive estimation methodologies.
Unfortunately limited degrees of freedom preclude the use in the present context. Our
discussion suggests the possibility of non linearity - as the ruling elite came to constitute
an ever smaller proportion of the total population, its response to the rising challenge was
…rst to increase repression, and then, once it became too small to resist further, it resorted
to accommodation through a negotiated settlement.Fractionalization and Long-Run Economic Growth 18
associated variables) in the output equation are stronger under the zero re-
strictiononcrime rates than in the …rst speci…cation, with0.23 for the invest-
ment rate, 0.074 for instability, and 0.30 for the user cost of capital. Implied
mean elasticities of the …rst cointegrating vectors are also considerably larger
than under the …rst speci…cation. Two problems remain with the speci…ca-
tion. First, the error correction characteristics of the speci…cation remains
poor, with explosive elements present in the instability equation. Second,
the impact of real per capita output on political rights remains negative, and
di¢cult to justify.
As a …nal speci…cation we therefore estimated the system of three equa-
tions, under an additional zero restriction on real per capita output in the
political rights equation. Identi…cation is given by, ¯14 = ¯16 = ¯17 = ¯19 =
0;¯21 = ¯24 = ¯25 = ¯28 = 0;¯31 = ¯32 = ¯36 = ¯37 = ¯38 = 0; while
the weak-exogeneity restrictions on racial fractionalization and the property
rights dimension, ®11 = ®12 = ®13 = ®51 = ®52 = ®53 = 0; remained un-
changed.
Results are reported in column (3) of Table 4.
For thespeci…cation of column (3), all variables have the prior anticipated
signs. Thus an increase in racial fractionalization raises our proxy for distri-
butional con‡ict (elasticity of 0.51), as does an increase in crime rates (mean
elasticity of 0.62). By contrast, rising real per capita income and property
rights lower political instability (mean elasticities of 17.46 and 0.76 respec-
tively). Both instability and user cost of capital lower real per capita output
(mean elasticities of 0.06 and 0.05 respectively), while the investment rate
exercises a positive impact (mean elasticity of 0.04). Finally, the impact of
property rights on political rights is positive, and approximately proportion
(mean elasticity of 1.01). Political instability exercises positive pressure on
political rights (mean elasticity of 0.18), presumably re‡ecting pressure for
change under conditions of poor rights. The only remaining cause for concern
is that evidence in favor of error correction behaviour is relatively weak in
the three equation structure investigated.28
The principal implication of the structural model estimations is that
the core features of the conjectural deliberations that emerged from the ex-
ploratory data analysis …nd con…rmation, even in a multivariate setting with
feedback loops. In summary, the …ndings con…rm an impact of racial frac-
28Impulse response analysis con…rms equilibriating behaviour in the system, though
stability emerges over a relatively long period of time.Fractionalization and Long-Run Economic Growth 19
tionalization on growth, but indirectly through its impact on distributional
con‡ict (political instability). Property rights exercise a similar impact via
political instability. Finally, political rights appear as an outcome variable
rather thanasa determinantofeconomic, social or other political dimensions.
5 Conclusions and Evaluations
The cross sectional growth literature makes bold claims about the e¤ects of
fractionalization on the long run growth prospects of countries.
What this paper has served to highlight is that the use of time series
evidence on the growth experience of a particular country adds considerable
nuance to the evidence.
The …rst general conclusion to emerge is that measures of social fraction-
alization show strong signs of change over time - and in a number of di¤erent
dimensions.
Second, we …nd that there exists evidence suggesting that the di¤erent
forms of social cleavage for which we have measures of fractionalization hang
together. The various social, political and institutional dimensions that this
paper controls for show signs of strong association amongst one another.
An immediate point that follows is that in the presence of such webs of
association spurious interpretation is an ever-present danger.
Third, not all measures of social cleavage impact on economic develop-
ment. In South Africa it is racial fractionalization that appears to matter,
while other forms of fractionalization have little impact on measures of eco-
nomic development. We infer from the evidence that it is distributional
con‡ict that impacts on economic growth - though distributional con‡ict
may be patterned along particular social cleavages. Which social cleavage,
when, how and for what period of time will depend on the historical path of
speci…c societies.
Fourth, there is some evidence to suggest that economic development in
turn can also impact on social fractionalization - without clear signs of asso-
ciation. Economic development appears to increase fractionalization in some
dimensions, and to homogenize in others. Moreover, during the course of
the paper we have repeatedly pointed to the possibility that the links we
have found between economic development and social fractionalization re-
lates readily to the literature on modernization.29 This is something that
29See Rodrik et al (2004) and Glaeser et al (2004) for evidence of the association betweenFractionalization and Long-Run Economic Growth 20
has not been seriously considered in the cross sectional growth literature,
namely that the association being reported between social fractionalization
and economic growth may be as a result of the causality running inthe oppo-
site direction. Inother words, fractionalization indexes may beendogenous to
economic development as agents choose to respond to signals and incentives
being transmitted through economic progress. In the South African case we
have demonstrated that language fractionalization does not appear to drive
economic growth but in fact responds to it as people amend their language
preference to better participate in the economic modernization process.
Fifth, political institutions in South Africa appear to be to some extent
endogenous to other social, political and economic dimensions which again
supports a modernization process. Economic and institutional development
appears to drive political rights. The implication is that forcing political
rights prematurely may prove problematic if the underlying institutions are
not readily able tosustain it. This is clearly contentious but is not unsubstan-
tiated. Barro (1996) makes a similar point in his cross sectional study about
countries that democratize prematurely and face perverse consequences and
he does in fact make such a claim regarding South Africa.
The conclusions of the paper suggest that the inclusion of SPIV’s in
growth regressions might bene…t from less hubris. What the literature has
suggested about ethnolingusitic fractionalization is that it matters. This is
plausible. It may even be true. But the evidence of this paper suggests that
the “it” that matters is really distributional con‡ict, which may be organized
along a number of alternative (society- perhaps historically-speci…c) lines of
social fractionalization. All social cleavage holds the potential danger of be-
ing mobilized in a manner that is disruptive of economic development - for
purposes of economic growth we should guard against the mobilization of
them all.
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 Description 
LANGFRAC  Linguistic fractionation: based on national census information. 
RELFRAC  Religious fractionation: based on national census information. 
POLFRAC  Political fractionation: based on representation in national parliament. 
INSTAB  Political instability: based on measure reported in Fedderke et al. (2001a). 
RACEFRAC  Racial fractionation: based on national census information. 
lnRGDP  Log of real GDP. 
GROWTH  Growth in real GDP. 
lnRGDPCAP  Log of real per capita GDP. 
POLRGHT  Political rights: based on measure reported in Fedderke et al. (2001a). 
PROPRGHT  Property rights: based on measure reported in Fedderke et al. (2001a). 
Capstock  Total real capital stock. 




Appendix B: Simple Correlation Coefficients 
 











RelFrac  1                               
LangFrac  -0.19  1                            
PolFrac  -0.65  0.19  1                         
PolRght  -0.77  0.09  0.84  1                      
PropRght  -0.29  -0.86  0.48  0.80  1                   
Instab  0.26  -0.45  -0.15  -0.24  0.10  1                
RGDP 0.71  -0.93  -0.55  0.06  0.74  0.35  1             
RGDP-CAP 0.88  -0.73  -0.73 -0.42  0.24  0.33  0.91  1          
GROWTH -0.06  0.55  0.03  -0.11  -0.42  -0.20  -0.31  -0.21  1       
Capstock 0.30 -0.95 -0.26  0.20  0.80 0.31  0.99 0.77  -0.56  1     
dKdt -0.16  0.71  -0.14  -0.46  -0.86 -0.37  -0.70 -0.33 0.44 -0.77  1 
























 Table 1: PSS F-tests for direction of association. Row headings denote forcing 
variables. Column headings outcome variables. * denotes unambiguous significance of 
the test statistic, allowing the rejection of the null of no association. ** denotes an 
indeterminate test statistic. 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
   RelFrac  LangFrac  PolFrac  PolRght  PropRght Instab lnRGDPCAP  GROWTH  dKdt  Race 
RelFrac -  18.58*  5.89*  0.89  4.62 3.95  6.97*  6.11* 1.50  5.73** 
LangFrac
1 4.97 -  1.98  6.71*  3.25  5.53** 2.74  1.54 1.19  8.54* 
PolFrac 4.39  27.20*  -  1.99  2.88 7.48*  2.14  7.86* 0.49  1.33 
PolRght 3.05  0.30  5.47**  -  1.97 4.59  4.64  3.90 1.50  1.86 
PropRght 2.89  0.28  2.80 4.19  -  5.86*  3.98 2.36  0.57  1.02 
Instab 3.36  13.62*  1.02  2.32  5.79* -  2.05  0.68  0.47  0.59 
lnRGDPCAP 2.90  45.32* 3.31 2.69 2.97  6.22*  -  2.96 2.84  1.69 
GROWTH 2.14  14.95*  1.60  1.86  6.79* 8.38*  2.99  -  1.88 1.26 
dKdt 0.52  3.61  2.55 2.51 2.44  5.81*  2.70 1.05  -  2.91 









































                                                           
1 Language fractionalization was restricted to the post 1946 period, given the absence of data on 
linguistic fractionalization in the African race group prior to the 1946 census. Table 2a: ARDL Cointegrating Estimations. * denotes statistical significance at the 5%, 
** at the 10% level. Round parentheses denote standard errors. Square parentheses 
denote probability levels. Curly parentheses denote the relevant test statistic 
distributed chi-square. 
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RelFrac   0.27** 
(0.13) 
     
RaceFrac     0.19* 
(0.01) 
    
Output      -0.01* 
(0.001) 
  
Growth       0.003* 
(0.0006) 
 




         






































2 0.76 0.71 0.96 0.83 0.73  0.69 



























 Table 2b: ARDL and VECM Cointegrating Estimations, * denotes statistical significance 
at the 5%. ** at the 10% level. Round parentheses denote standard errors. Square 
parentheses denote probability levels. Curly parentheses denote the relevant test 
statistic distributed chi-square. 
 






















LangFrac    18590.5 
(34955.3) 
 






    
        


























2 0.29 0.30  0.33  0.31 
































 Table 2c: ARDL and VECM Cointegrating Estimations. * denotes statistical significance 
at the 5%, ** at the 10% level. Round parentheses denote standard errors. Square 
parentheses denote probability levels. Double square parentheses the critical values of 
the relevant test statistic. Curly parentheses denote the relevant test statistic 
distributed chi-square. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Outcome 
Variable: 



















     λTRACE 27.41* 
[[17.86]] 
RaceFrac   15.90** 
(8.99) 
       
lnOutput    1.11* 
(0.46) 
      
Growth      -0.22 
(0.18) 
    
dK/dt       -0.14 
(0.14) 
  
PropRght          -0.03* 
{3.94} 
           











   

























2 0.30 0.27 0.30 0.27 0.34  Adj-R
2 0.27 




Table 3: Trace statistics; VAR=2; *denotes rejection of the null at the 5% 
 




r=0 r=1 285.98*  0.00 
r≤1 r=2 181.20*  0.00 
r≤2 r=3 129.23*  0.007 
r≤3 r=4  88.099 0.054 
r≤4 r=5  62.350 0.065 
r≤5 r=6  39.028 0.116 
r≤6 r=7  20.562 0.202 
r≤7 r=8  8.2330 0.240 







Table 4: Structural Equation Estimation Result 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
  CV1 CV2  CV3 CV1 CV2  CV3 CV1  CV2 CV3 
DRACE 1734.2 
(309.44) 
0.00 0.00  3418.8 
(668.26) 









































INVRAT 0.00  -0.35 
(0.21) 
0.00 0.00 -1.03 
(0.83) 
0.00 0.00 -0.16 
(0.15) 
0.00 
UC 0.00  0.01 
(0.001) 
0.00 0.00 0.02 
(0.01) 









0.00 0.00 -35.15 
(23.05) 
0.00 0.00 













































































  Elasticities at Means:  Elasticities at Means:  Elasticities at Means: 
DRACE  -0.83    -1.63    -0.51     
LYPC  18.27  2.83  19.85  2.84  17.46     
INSTAB     0.06  -0.03     0.07  -0.01     0.06  -0.18 
POL                            
PROP 1.26     -0.90  3.04     -1.04  0.79     -1.01 
INVRAT   -0.08     -0.23      -0.04   
UC   0.07     0.30      0.05   
































Figure 1: Implication of Bivariate PSS F-tests for Direction of Association between SPIV 
Variables. 